Ireland's OWN: History

 

British Counter Insurgency Strategy from The Sovereign Nation, May/June 2000 The following are extracts from a paper by the late Pat Mc Geown entitled  "British Counter Insurgency Strategy". This paper was written at the time of the Brooke talks in 1991. Much of Mc Geown's analysis has proved prophetic in relation to how the British state went about defeating the Provisionals. More importantly it is an aid to Republicans today in learning from past mistakes and eliminating them from our strategies. In essence Britain's counter-insurgency strategy, which at present dates from the arrival of British forces, their generals and experts in 1969 to the present day. It is best described as a political/military strategy co-ordinating governmental, judicial, economic, social and psychological agencies and dimensions, and aimed at containing, isolating and destroying identifiable resistance. Let's remind ourselves of the five essential elements that compose the substance of British counter-insurgency strategy in Ireland, not only at the high points but on a day to day working basis: a. Identify the enemy and its reasons for existence. b. Co-ordinate the resources and personnel of all sections of the establishment against it. c. Contain the enemy and wear it down tactically. d. Isolate and frustrate it is every way, politically and militarily. e. Destroy it. This sectionalising of the process should not be taken as meaning that each is separate, or that one follows from the other in clear cut form as there is much overlapping.. While the 'counter-insurgency' expert starts by 'identifying', he is already 'co-ordinating' and so on, while he is 'containing and isolating' he is continually trying to identify new faces and approaches etc. They are continuous processes only finished when he has 'destroyed'.  (a)...Identifying the enemy and it's reasons for existence..  Right from the start British strategy had political and military dimensions. . The Labour government of the day appeared to veer on the side of appeasement of the rebellious nationalist population, buying them off with reform in an attempt to control them again. They actively encouraged the setting up of the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party), a Catholic middle class party set up around John Hume in an effort to take politics off the street, where the constitutional nationalists had little control, and back into the safe corridors of power in Westminster and Stormont (Northern Ireland's local parliament).  By giving the SDLP their patronage they effectively chose the nationalist leadership that they would deal with and they promoted them in the media and press. These are age-old tactics of counter-insurgents in the broadest sense. The Unionists saw the situation differently. They saw all disorder as resulting from IRA conspiracies. The way to put them down was by force and threat of force. The RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary), the armed militia that simply reflected and defended political unionism, supported this view. The British Army at this juncture appear to have been content to just fulfill the first role of counter-insurgency, identify your enemy and the possible causes of discontent. Meetings held between senior British army personnel and IRA leadership at local level were an integral part of this process and also had the primary effect of keeping things quiet without having to actually initiate major political reform that could destabilise unionism. The IRA had of course their own agenda. But again it was an old Brit psychological 'counter-insurgency' tactic 'making the opposition feel important, by structuring them into an institution of state' without handing them any real power. This was to be used again with even greater effect in the 1975 IRA cease-fire period. (b)...Co-ordinate all resources and personnel...  A 'Joint Security Committee' had been established aimed at linking all the machinery of the state and its forces together into a powerful 'War Machine' capable of a co-ordinated and controlled politico/military response. However, those who sat on it had differing priorities or short-term objectives. The membership in early 1972 was the unionist Prime Minister, two unionist Cabinet ministers. the British Army GOC, the RUC Chief, and one British government representative. It's make-up demonstrates a heavy imbalance towards unionist phobias and paranoia. It was to cause much friction between Brit army counter insurgency experts and the Stormont administration and local forces. As British military 'counter insurgency' experts like Brigadier Frank Kitson began to arrive in the North carrying with them the experience of British counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus, that tension would increase. Kitson at this time was at Oxford University, writing the British Army's counter-insurgency' bible, "Low Intensity Operations". He was undoubtedly brought to the North in 1970 with the dual brief; to attempt to structure a 'counter insurgency' response and to gain experience of what was a relatively new 'counter-insurgency' situation. There were things that could be done in the far off obscure ends of the 'Empire', which could not be done under the watchful eye of the mass media, in a so-called liberal democratic society so close to Britain and Western Europe. The 'counter-insurgency' strategy for Ireland in the 70's would require a degree of sophistication and subtlety that the unionists were certainly showing themselves incapable of. It would have more to do with propaganda than physical show of strength. This is reflected in the Brit understanding that right from the start they needed to dictate how others saw the essence of the problem in the North. Their first propaganda victory was in getting acceptance for the explanation that the North's 'troubles' had sectarian roots and that British soldiers were the 'peace-keepers'. This is not to say that Kitson advocated a 'softly softly' approach, and his use of a curfew' on the Falls Road in his first days here adequately demonstrates this. Rather, what Kitson saw as important was that all the institutions of state be co-ordinated to provide a disciplined and controlled politico/military response. (c)...Contain the Enemy: Wear it down tactically.  By 1972 nationalist Ireland was almost completely alienated from the British and it was recognised that--as opposed to 'containing' the situation, and allowing it to evolve towards a climate in which a political settlement could be initiated to isolate the 'insurgents'--another cornerstone of 'counter insurgency' strategy, the opposite was happening. Even with the mass internment arrests the IRA had no shortage or recruits and apparently unlimited support and sympathy within the nationalist community, while the possible 'appeasement nationalists' the SDLP had been forced almost completely out of the system through which reform could be initiated. There was a serious imbalance in the politico/military strategy towards the military solution. Through the suspension of Stormont, the institution of direct British government rule and the short-lived IRA truce the British initiated a new political climate which would allow them to rebalance their strategy towards bringing in the reformers (SDLP) and 'isolating' the revolutionaries (IRA). Or at least ensure that the situation didn't deteriorate further, beyond an 'acceptable level of violence.' The climax of this phase of Brit 'counter insurgency' strategy would be the attempted political settlement, and subsequent failure, of Sunningdale in 1974. "As for Special laws and powers they were progressively introduced; the Emergency Provisions Act, (a refined version of the Special Powers Act),--reforms are often little more than refined versions of repressive methods--the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the introduction of juryless Diplock courts. A further important tactic in use during this phase, and with lasting effects, was the use of Brit 'counter-insurgency' operatives in the 26 Counties to attempt to isolate Republicans and allow more pro-Brit elements in the government to have their way. The planting of bombs in Dublin on the eve of a parliamentary debate on special legislation was an example. The whole concept of psychological warfare was something that Kitson pioneered and later went on to teach to all British officers during training as 'psych-ops'. The full extent of 'psych-ops' is infinite and revolutionary, in other words it is continually updated. However, we do know the basic principles--'discredit, demoralise, and intimidate'--some examples of their practical use have been made public in the revelations of ex-British army personnel and agents. It ranges from the most basic black propaganda to murder. Kitson accepted the Mao analysis of what makes guerrillas/insurgents tick, when he wrote, "It is in men's minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided.' Following on this psychological state of the collective and individual insurgent's mind becomes a target. As indeed does the hearts and minds of the people who support and shelter them. One technique that became very much a fixation with the Kitsonian 'counter insurgency' strategists and is still in use today was the attempt to create a 'split' in Republican ranks. The 'hawks' and 'doves' stories that continue to appear are an important part of this process. As are the 'going political' stories and their sensationalist 'touts and traitors' line. A brief look at the background of the type of publications and journalists who produce such drivel should demonstrate to anyone where their sympathies lie. A former Brit member of the 'black propaganda unit; Colin Wallace, had much to say about these types of stories and what their aim was. While there are many other examples of how the technique worked in the early years, the best years for a practical study of the battle of hearts and minds is post 1976, when the processes of Normalisation, Ulsterisation and Criminalisation were introduced. (d) ...Isolate and frustrate the enemy in every politically and militarily. For a range of tactical reasons, the British administration had decided to enter into talks with the IRA in late 1974, early 1975. Not least amongst those reasons was that a 'breathing space' would give them time to prepare the ground for their new policies. They believed that after an initial cooling off period the 'new RUC' could be made, if not more acceptable to nationalists, then at least more apt when linked with the UDR at military type patrolling and containment in nationalist areas. Also, by using a 'police force' as the frontline defence against insurgency it may be possible to depoliticize the situation and portray it as something less than a war, a battle between 'police and criminal gangs'. And a reduction in the level of actual British troops could be portrayed as part of this cosmetic exercise. ...Normalisation. If Ulsterisation was in essence a military strategy with political and psychological dimensions, Normalisation was essentially the political, social and economic prong. Its central plank was to convince people that normality or peace was returning and that there was no need for war. The 'terrorists' were the only ones who didn't want peace. If they could turn the nationalist community against the insurgents, or make them think they had turned them, they could isolate the insurgent. Thousands of millions of pounds were pumped in during this period to give the impression of growing prosperity and fairness. New housing went up wholesale particularly in nationalist areas. Estates (housing projects in American parlance. facilitator note.) were specifically designed by 'counter insurgency' specialists, so that they could be easily sealed off in the event of an incident. Factories and industry appeared to be booming, again with particular direction towards nationalist areas. Leisure centres (community centres) grew up out of nowhere. Everywhere things appeared to be getting better. "If only the terrorists would stop all could be rosy"..."and anyway, the terrorists were being defeated"..."They were less effective than they had been, the arrest and conviction rates were up and the nationalist community were informing on them". These were all common propaganda lines of the day and statistics were produced to back up their image. The opportunist use by Brit propaganda units of an incident involving IRA volunteers when three children were killed and the subsequent 'gut-reaction' peace movement, to give the impression that the nationalist community were rejecting the IRA is another example of the tactic of psychological warfare in action. This period also saw the increased and more refined co- ordination of all sections of state control, (control in the ideological sense as much as physical). Business leaders met with Generals and RUC chiefs, NIO (Northern Ireland Office, the official British government department charged with administering Northern Ireland. facilitator) officials met with church leaders at a local level, and with press and media people on a regular basis to ensure that their line and explanations were carried. While within the state forces, the fight against insurgents became more refined. Targeting of individual Republicans as opposed to the community became the order of the day. The policy of normalisation is an ongoing one so it would be wrong to attempt to judge its real success or failure yet. But what is clear, is that primarily the reason that it has not brought the Brits the success they planned for is because of their inability to get an internal political settlement. Without that the facade of normality doesn't hold up internally or internationally. ...Criminalisation.. This was to become the most controversial and least secure part of the 'counter-insurgency' strategy. It began with the announcement in 1975 that no one arrested after March 1976 would be entitled to political status in the prisons, but its scope went far wider that prison policy. The Brit propaganda line through which they hoped to influence 'hearts and minds' here and abroad was that things were returning to normal; those who continued to resist were going against the better interests of the community, therefore they should be treated as common criminals. As it was essentially a 'law and order problem', the way to deal with them was investigation, arrest, conviction, and sentencing to a normal prison with no privileges under the due process of law. And anyway, they were 'Mafia-like led by Godfathers only interested in personal gain.' What the psychologically oriented propaganda line hid was special laws, special 'no-jury' courts, presided over by unionist judges who happily accepted co-ordination into the war machine, and ignored torture and ill-treatment as a way of getting convictions which are usually the result of community co-operation in a normal society. Over 80 percent of people convicted in this period were imprisoned on the basis of 'self-incriminating' statements signed under physical pressure and threat in purpose-built interrogation centres. The onus of proof of guilt, normal principle of law, was shifted so that the accused had to prove they were innocent. Essentially, in Kitson's own words, the law became "...just another weapon in the government's arsenal..." which "...becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public." Resistance to criminalisation, particularly within the prisons, and ultimately with the hunger strike deaths of 1981 effectively limited the success of this policy. However, it did play an important role in 'counter insurgency' strategy during the late '70's. (e)...Destroy the Enemy...  Present Brit counter insurgency strategy centres around the Hillsborough Treaty, aimed at nationalists and the Brooke talks aimed at unionists. It is based on a 'balancing act', an attempt to balance all anti-revolutionary forces in Ireland, be they British oriented, or 'constitutional nationalist', in a unified structure of sorts which can then be co-ordinated into the British counter insurgency forces and used to isolate and crush Republican opposition. The Hillsborough Treaty was the start of this process. And it's worth remembering it is a 'revolutionary process.' That is, the plans have not been laid out, just the principles, so that adjustments can be made. The common principle of all involved is to destroy Republican resistance and the potential revolutionary alternative that it may offer to the Irish people. It has an Irish dimension only in so far that 26 County politicians now see it in their interests to that the force of revolution be crushed before they threaten their power and privilege. In this, they have become effective open allies of the Brits and turned their backs completely on national liberation for their own personal interests. The Hillsborough strategy had to undergo changes because of loyalist misunderstanding and intransigence. The Brooks talks are about balancing Hillsborough's illusion of an Irish dimension, and stabilizing unionists through the demand for the amendment of dropping Articles 2 and 3 (articles in the Irish constitution that refuse to recognise partition, and which consider that, in theory, Irish law extends through all of Ireland.) But in essence the process begun at Hillsborough in 1985 will remain, although its mutual slope and title may change. It marked the first total co-ordination of all counter revolutionary forces in Ireland and Britain. Like all phases of 'counter insurgency' strategy already used it will be evolved and refined in the days ahead and it is important to remember this when dealing with counter insurgency/revolutionary strategy. It mirrors revolutionary strategy in that it too has to be progressive. Albeit only in so far that it brings about limited reforms as those who hold power attempt to hold onto it. The prise that is being played for is who holds power. It can't be static. Because in the main, the Hillsborough process is the current Brit counter insurgency strategy directed against Republicans, we look at it more closely. It is worthwhile remembering the climate in which Hillsborough was conceived and initiated in. There had long been an acceptance amongst military strategists that the IRA could not be defeated militarily. In the period after the hunger strikes and with Sinn Fein's move to radical revolutionary politics and into the public electoral process and their apparent success there, it was felt by the nationalist 'constitutionalists' that unless the Brit government moved there was a danger that the situation would no longer be containable. The Brits saw an opener in the nationalist community in that if the SDLP could be brought in to an internal settlement then the nationalist community could be divided with a significant section siding with British interests. In such a situation it may be possible to mop up the IRA and, through isolating the political force of Sinn Fein, to render it impotent. It required the creating of a basic illusion to end deep nationalist alienation, and some very subtle management to increase the prestige of the SDLP and church (the main anti- revolutionary parties in the nationalist community) to do so. Funding of community based ACE schemes under church and SDLP patronage and the putting down of others and the careful management of international funding are ways of doing this. Hillsborough was all about providing the illusion of an Irish Dimension, whereby basic nationalist rights could be protected by the Dublin government in consultation with London and where it was possible that sometime in the future a United Ireland, the basic ideological target the supports Republicanism, could be negotiated. The practical implementation of this strategy, designed to split and recruit a section of the nationalist community, required a re-identification of who actually was the enemy., as some old enemies may now be allies, a re-look at co-ordination as there was now the extra dimension of cross-border co-operation, a limited open co-operation of the SDLP and church, and a refinement of containment and isolation in the light of the above. The full effectiveness of the Hillsborough process as a 'counter insurgency' strategy with the potential for destroying Republican resistance remains to be seen. However, one can already see the cracks appearing as the perfect theory is tested against day to day practical implementation. Also the obvious weakness in the Hillsborough/Brooke balancing act is precisely this. It is a balancing act in theory. Too much emphasis or weight to either side and it can tilt out of balance, causing fragmentation. Republicans attempt to influence this by making it difficult for 'constitutional' nationalists to go further into this alliance through conceding Articles 2 and 3, and completely surrendering to Brit/Loyalists. But the internal contradictions of the 'balancing act' are its biggest obstacle. Has it the potential for destroying the Republican Movement? There are two answers to this, a simple basic no, or a more complex analytical response. The basic Republican prediction is that it will fail to bring peace in the same way that other phases have failed simply because armed and political resistance are a 'response' to British rule and all the tinkering and illusion making in the world does not change that reality. Nor does it change the fact that to maintain British rule in the North the British have to rely on a 'divided community', not one necessarily divided on sectarian lines, but divided on the lines of power and privilege. Those who fall on the wrong side of the line, in the frustrating position of no power or privilege have only one means of asserting their voice, through political conflict and armed struggle. These of course will always be the people who are either less supportive of, or don't support British rule at all. Page updated 16 Mar 2008 Ireland's OWN Logo by Eamann Website Design and Celtic Background by Míchealín Daugherty Copyright © 2008 Ireland's OWN All Rights Reserved.